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ADVISING COMPLIANCE IN  
FINANCIAL FIRMS: A NEW MISSION  
FOR THE LEGAL ACADEMY 
James A. Fanto* 
This introduction to the symposium issue provides background on the 
subject of compliance in financial firms, whose task is to ensure that a 
broker-dealer and its employees comply with applicable laws and 
regulations. It explains the tasks of compliance in financial firms and 
discusses its origins, particularly in the statutory and regulatory obligation 
of supervision that is placed upon financial firms and their managers. It then 
looks at the reasons for the growth in importance of compliance in recent 
years, as well as the likely continued significance of this firm function. It 
particularly emphasizes how the recent financial reform legislation 
enhanced the role of compliance and diffused it into previously unregulated 
financial firms. It next offers several reasons why legal scholars have not 
devoted much attention to financial firm compliance and also discusses why 
compliance is attracting more scholarly attention, partly because law 
graduates are increasingly entering this field. It concludes by offering a few 
thoughts on how the legal academy can help compliance become more 
successful in its mission, with a reference to contributions of the professors 
made during the symposium and to useful work in managerial studies on 
how to build effective compliance programs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There were several motivations for our symposium on financial firm 
compliance, entitled “The Growth and Importance of Compliance in 
Financial Firms: Meaning and Implications.”1 First, since the role of 
compliance officers has become important and grown in prestige in 
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 1. This symposium took place on February 8, 2013, at Brooklyn Law School. 
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financial firms, it was interesting and useful to explore the reasons for this 
phenomenon in an academic setting. Second, the growth in importance of 
compliance has occurred without attracting much attention from legal 
scholars. Devoting a symposium to the subject helps partly to remedy this 
situation. Third, the symposium was also worthwhile to our students 
because they appear to be entering into this field in increasing numbers, for, 
in an otherwise gloomy job market, compliance represents a potential area 
of job growth. Fourth, alumni of our school have important positions in the 
compliance field and one of the purposes of our Center for the Study of 
Business Law & Regulation is to connect our students to alumni in business 
law practice. Accordingly, a symposium on compliance brought several of 
our alumni working in compliance to the school for this purpose.2 
For the symposium we invited legal scholars who follow developments 
in finance closely and who are knowledgeable about broker-dealers and 
investment advisers. To a person, they recognized the importance of the 
topic and were happy to participate in the symposium. Moreover, as noted 
above, the symposium included practitioners in compliance. The design of 
the symposium was to have presentations by professors on compliance-
related issues, with compliance practitioners commenting on their talks, 
often to inject a real-world perspective into the discussion. The Articles 
presented in this issue represent the fruit of that exchange but only 
imperfectly capture the lively debates that occurred during the symposium.3 
In this Introduction to the symposium issue, I shall provide background 
on the subject of compliance. Part I will explain the nature of compliance in 
financial firms and discuss its origins, particularly in the statutory and 
regulatory obligation of supervision that is placed upon financial firms and 
their managers. Part II will look at the reasons for the growth in importance 
of compliance in recent years, as well as the likely continued significance of 
this firm function. It will particularly emphasize how the recent financial 
reform legislation enhanced the role of compliance. Part III will offer 
several reasons why legal scholars have not devoted much attention to 
financial firm compliance. This Part will also discuss why compliance is 
attracting more scholarly attention, partly because law graduates are 
increasingly entering this field. The Article concludes by offering a few 
thoughts on how the legal academy can help compliance become more 
successful in its mission, with a reference to contributions of the professors 
made during the symposium. 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Commentators at the symposium included Ira Goldberg (class of ‘96), a managing director 
of JP Morgan Securities; Jonathan Gottlieb (class of ‘92), a managing director and senior counsel 
at RBS Securities; Jane A. Kanter (class of ‘73), a partner at Dechert LLP; and Andrew S. 
Margolin (class of ‘90), managing director and associate general counsel of Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch. 
 3. The symposium was a success even though it took place on a Friday when a blizzard rolled 
into the New York area! 
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I. COMPLIANCE, ITS ORIGINS AND PRESENT STATE 
It is first useful to identify the compliance function in a firm.4 To put 
things simply, the basic job of compliance is to ensure that a broker-dealer 
and its employees comply with applicable laws and regulations.5 The 
relevant laws and regulations are mainly the federal securities laws and 
regulations of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC), but 
they also include the rules and professional standards of self-regulatory 
organizations (SROs),6 as well as the diverse kinds of laws that apply to 
financial firms today (e.g., anti-money laundering rules).7 Compliance, 
which is composed of compliance officers, occupies a middle position 
between the business of the broker-dealer, on the one hand, and regulators 
and SRO officials, on the other. Compliance officers do not engage in the 
firm’s securities business, but are part of one of its oversight or control 
functions, like internal accounting, internal control, and legal.8 Indeed, in its 
early days compliance was a task of or a subdivision within the legal 
department.9 As a result of this oversight function, investment bankers, 
brokers, and other business employees of broker-dealers traditionally 
looked down upon and even resented compliance officers as being an 
unproductive part of, and even an impediment to, the investment banking 
                                                                                                                 
 4. The discussion will focus on compliance only in broker-dealers, who are regulated under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012), since 
compliance is well developed in broker-dealers. A broker-dealer is a firm, registered as such under 
the Exchange Act, id. § 78o, that, as is typical, conducts both the functions of a “broker,” which 
acts as an agent for others in securities transactions, id. § 78c(a)(4), and a “dealer,” which 
generally is in the business of making markets in securities, id. § 78c(a)(5). 
 5.  See SEC. IND. ASS’N, LEGAL & COMPLIANCE DIV., WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF 
COMPLIANCE 2 (2005) [hereinafter SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE],  
available at http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/societies/sifma_compliance_and_legal_society 
/role_of_compliance_white_paper%20%282%29.pdf.  
 6. SROs are securities organizations where the members, rather than an outside body, 
primarily regulate themselves. See 1 NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER 
LAW AND REGULATION § 4-3 to 4-4 (4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2013). The Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 is based upon a self-regulatory model, where SROs do much of the regulation subject to the 
oversight of the SEC. See id. § 4-3. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which 
is a union of the former self-regulatory arms of the National Association of Securities Dealers (the 
NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange (the NYSE), is the main SRO for broker-dealers and is 
a registered securities association under section 15A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3. At 
the symposium, our opening speaker was Grace B. Vogel, FINRA’s Executive Vice President of 
Member Regulation. 
 7. See SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 5. 
 8. It is true that, in smaller firms, a broker, trader, or supervisor of the firm may also be a 
compliance officer because the firm is not large enough to have a separate compliance department 
or group. Or, in a small firm, the only compliance officer may be engaged in multiple control 
functions (e.g., be both the main privacy officer and chief anti-money laundering officer). 
 9. See O. Ray Vass, The Compliance Officer in Today’s Regulatory Environment, BROKER-
DEALER INSTITUTE, at 49 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 579, 1987) 
(discussing early configuration of compliance in firms). 
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and securities business.10 A compliance officer helps ensure that the firm 
and its employees follow the laws and regulations, but he or she does not 
have the status and independence of a regulator or an SRO official, 
although he or she may have spent part of the career with the SEC or 
FINRA and this experience may have played a role in his or her obtaining 
the compliance officer position.11 Yet, as discussed below, regulators work 
closely with compliance officers and may consider them their eyes and ears 
in a firm.12 
To a great extent, compliance in broker-dealers grew out of broker-
dealers’ supervisory obligations over their personnel under the federal 
securities laws.13 To show this demands a brief review of several key 
statutory provisions for broker-dealers. Section 15(b)(4)(D) of the 
Exchange Act empowers the SEC to discipline a broker-dealer for, among 
other things, the willful violation of, or the inability to comply with, the 
federal securities laws or their regulations by the broker-dealer itself or by 
any person “associated with” the broker-dealer.14 If an employee of a 
broker-dealer willfully violated the securities laws or regulations, the 
broker-dealer would be subject to SEC discipline under this statutory 
provision, which could include suspension of its registration for up to 
twelve months or the “death sentence” of revocation of registration.15 This 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See Todd L. Spillane, So You Are a Compliance Officer, Now What? PRAC. COMPLIANCE 
& RISK MGMT. FOR THE SEC. INDUS., Nov.–Dec. 2010, at 1, 2–3 (describing the delicate 
relationship between compliance officers and business people). 
 11. See PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, DANGEROUS LIAISONS: REVOLVING DOOR AT SEC 
CREATES RISK OF REGULATORY CAPTURE 2 (2013), available at http://pogoarchives.org 
/ebooks/20130211-dangerous-liaisons-sec-revolving-door.pdf (“The movement of people to and 
from the financial industry is a key feature of the SEC, and it has the potential to influence the 
agency’s culture and values.”). The purpose of this report is to highlight the danger of regulatory 
capture, particularly as it affects decisions by regulators to pursue lawsuits against financial firms. 
However, it indicates the interest of financial firms in hiring former regulators in control 
functions. Many senior compliance officers have spent time with the SEC or FINRA. For 
example, Jonathan Gottlieb, who was one of the alumni compliance officers present at our 
symposium, formerly worked for the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. 
 12. See infra text accompanying note 44. 
 13. The focus here is only on the brokerage industry-specific origins of compliance within 
broker-dealers. See generally Miriam Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 
949, 958–75 & nn.48–162 (2009) (discussing origins of corporate compliance and referencing the 
significant contributions to the scholarly literature about them). Professor Baer, who is a specialist 
on the interrelationship between compliance and enforcement, among other things, was a 
commentator at our symposium. 
 14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(D) (2012). “Associated person” is itself defined in section 
3(a)(18) of the Exchange Act to include “any partner, officer, director, or branch manager of such 
broker or dealer (or any person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions), any 
person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with such broker 
or dealer, or any employee of such broker or dealer.” Id. § 78c(a)(18). This definition sweeps 
within it all those who engage in the securities business in a broker-dealer, as well as controlling 
persons, but an exception (not quoted above) excludes clerical and ministerial employees, among 
others. Id. 
 15. See generally Task Force on Broker-Dealer Supervision & Compliance of the Comm. on 
Fed. Regulation of Sec., Broker-Dealer Supervision of Registered Representatives and Branch 
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statutory provision thus gives a broker-dealer an incentive to supervise its 
employees to ensure that they comply with applicable laws and regulations 
so that it can, in fact, stay in business. 
Section 15(b)(4)(D) was a rough and imperfect instrument for the SEC 
to ensure legal compliance by broker-dealers and their employees because it 
allows the SEC to discipline only the firm, not the violating employee, and 
it does not provide for discipline of firm supervisors.16 The Securities Acts 
Amendments of 1964 enhanced supervision, and gave a major impetus to 
compliance, by adding sections 15(b)(4)(E) and 15(b)(6).17 Under section 
15(b)(4)(E), a broker-dealer is subject to sanctions if, among other things, 
it, or an associated person, willfully aided or abetted a federal securities law 
or rule violation or “failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to 
preventing” the violation, the person who committed the violation.18 This 
amendment made the broker-dealer explicitly liable for its own, and its 
associated persons’, supervisory violations. Furthermore, section 15(b)(6) 
empowers the SEC to discipline an associated person who, among other 
things, willfully aids and abets a violation of the federal securities laws or 
who commits a supervisory violation.19 Under this provision the SEC can 
discipline branch managers and other supervisors in a broker-dealer for 
their failure to supervise employees under their authority. These explicit 
supervisory obligations on firms and firm supervisors created an enhanced 
need for a broker-dealer to have people (i.e., compliance officers) to tell the 
supervisors and the other employees what compliance with the laws and 
regulations entails so that the employees could conduct themselves in a 
lawful manner and the supervisors could properly conduct their supervision 
and avoid supervisory liability. 
Even more importantly for the growth of compliance, section 
15(b)(4)(E) provides both the firm—and, through section 15(b)(6), firm 
supervisors—with defenses to a supervisory violation charge. It states that 
“no person shall be deemed to have failed reasonably to supervise any other 
person” if, first, there were “established procedures, and a system for 
applying” them, “which would reasonably be expected to prevent and 
detect, insofar as practicable,” any securities law violations by the 
supervised person.20 It further stipulates that the supervisor has 
“reasonably” to discharge the duties under the procedures and system 
                                                                                                                 
Office Operations, 44 BUS. LAW. 1361, 1363–64 (1989) (discussing the SEC’s early legal theories 
to enforce supervisory liability upon broker-dealers, which included the standard tort doctrine of 
respondeat superior). 
 16. See POSER & FANTO, supra note 6, § 9-5 to 9-6. 
 17. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, sec. 6(b), § 15(b)(4)(E), (6), 78 
Stat. 565, 571–72 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E), (6)). 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E). 
 19. Id. § 78o(b)(6). This section imposes the supervisory obligation through a cross-reference 
to section 15(b)(4)(E). 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E)(i). 
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“without reasonable cause to believe” that the supervised person was not 
complying with these procedures and system.21 This language means that 
the firm and its supervisors have a statutory defense if the firm has well- 
drafted supervisory procedures for ensuring that the firm and all its 
employees comply with securities laws and regulations, as well as a system, 
that is, the resources and responsible people, to implement these 
procedures. Moreover, the firm and its supervisors have to demonstrate that 
they actually fulfilled their responsibilities under these procedures and 
system (i.e., that the system was properly functioning and not just for 
show).  
This availability of the statutory defense to a charge of failure to 
supervise led to the growth of compliance, since broker-dealers would have 
a real interest in having a firm function—compliance—that would be 
responsible for drafting the supervisory procedures and assisting the firm 
and its supervisors in the implementation of the supervisory system. 
Moreover, compliance officers would ensure that the last prong of the 
statutory defense—that the procedures and the system were being followed 
in practice—was satisfied. Firms would accomplish this by having 
compliance officers monitor employees for legal compliance and follow up 
on any problem or potential problem (known in the trade as a “red flag”)22 
that surfaced in a firm, which could suggest a legal violation and thus 
potentially a supervisory one. In sum, a firm and its supervisors can take 
advantage of the statutory defense by having a compliance department, or at 
least compliance officers, devoted to creating a well-functioning 
supervisory system for them to follow. The origin of compliance is, 
therefore, in the avoidance of supervisory liability. 
SRO supervisory requirements similarly spurred the growth of 
compliance in firms, although by imposing a direct supervisory obligation 
on firms rather than indirectly through a defense to liability. The Exchange 
Act requires SROs to ensure that their members comply with federal 
securities laws and regulations, as well as with their own rules, and to have 
rules designed to “prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, 
[and] to promote just and equitable principles of trade.”23 FINRA’s 
requirements of supervision are extremely detailed. FINRA requires each of 
its members to have “a system to supervise the activities of each registered 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Id. § 78o(b)(4)(E)(ii). 
 22. A “red flag” is an unusual event or practice that could be a sign of a securities violation 
and, therefore, that must be monitored or investigated. See, e.g., Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release 
No. 31,554, 1992 WL 362753, at *12 (Dec. 3, 1992) [hereinafter Gutfreund] (red flags are 
“‘suggestions’ of irregularity”). 
 23. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(2), (6) (for securities associations); id. § 78f(b)(1), (5) (for 
exchanges). The SEC reviews the rules in connection with the registration of an association or an 
exchange, as well as ongoing proposed rule changes or ones initiated by the SEC. See id.  
§ 78s(a)–(c). 
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representative, registered principal,24 and other associated person that is 
reasonably designed to achieve compliance” with securities laws and 
regulations and FINRA rules.25 Among other things, the system requires a 
broker-dealer to have written procedures for the supervision of each of its 
securities businesses and associated persons (written supervisory 
procedures or WSPs), to designate supervisors for each regulated business, 
to have annual compliance reviews for each registered representative and 
principal, to have internal inspections of all offices, to have a principal 
review of the transactions and correspondence with the public of registered 
representatives relating to their securities business, and to investigate the 
character and qualifications of any associated person.26 Since SRO rules 
govern each securities business activity and dictate how it is to be 
conducted in accordance with the law, nearly every FINRA rule has 
supervisory and, therefore, compliance implications.27 FINRA rules grow or 
are modified each year as firms develop new businesses and products and as 
new legal obligations are imposed upon them.28 A broker-dealer must have 
a division or group of employees—in other words, compliance—who can 
keep track of all of the legal and regulatory duties of the firm and associated 
                                                                                                                 
 24. “Principals” are associated persons “who are actively engaged in the management of the 
member’s investment banking or securities business, including supervision, solicitation, conduct 
of business or the training of persons associated with a member for any of these functions are 
designated as principals.” See NASD Rules, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display 
/display_viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=605&record_id=607 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) 
[hereinafter NASD Rules] (NASD Rule 1021(b)). As a result of the consolidation of the NASD 
and the regulatory arm of the NYSE into FINRA, a new FINRA rulebook combining the rules of 
each of these SROs is being prepared and implemented. See FINRA, FINRA MANUAL: OFFICIAL 
PUBLICATION OF THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY (2011) [hereinafter 
FINRA MANUAL]. As a result, currently FINRA rules include some NASD rules, some NYSE 
rules (which apply only to broker-dealers formerly regulated by the NYSE), and the new FINRA 
rules (the latter apply to all broker-dealers). See id. at 21–111 (providing comprehensive 
conversion tables between the NASD, NYSE, and FINRA Rules). Associated persons who are not 
principals are generally “representatives,” a term defined to mean  
 
[p]ersons associated with a member, including assistant officers other than principals, who 
are engaged in the investment banking or securities business for the member including the 
functions of supervision, solicitation or conduct of business in securities or who are engaged 
in the training of persons associated with a member for any of these functions are designated 
as representatives.   
 
NASD Rules, supra note 24 (NASD Rule 1031(b)). 
 25. See NASD Rules, supra note 24 (NASD Rule 3010(a)). 
 26. See id. (NASD Rule 3010(a)–(e)). 
 27. See, e.g., FINRA, Deferred Variable Annuities, Reg. Notice No. 07-53, at 7 (Nov. 2007), 
available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices 
/p037421.pdf (discussing supervision involved with new rule on the sale or exchange of variable 
annuities). 
 28. See, e.g., FINRA, Customer Assets, Reg. Notice No. 09-64 (Nov. 2009), available at 
https://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p120372.pdf 
(discussing enhanced supervision in light of, among other things, cases involving 
misappropriation of customer assets). 
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persons and who can help the firm’s employees satisfy their obligations, 
and the supervisors their supervisory duties, through guidance, monitoring, 
and follow-up. 
Moreover, NASD Rule 3012 requires that a firm have one or more 
principals who set up supervisory controls to test its supervisory system on 
a yearly basis in order to assess its compliance effectiveness and to identify 
the need for additional WSPs.29 Under this rule, the responsible principal or 
principals establish the controls, conduct the testing, create additional WSPs 
to respond to weaknesses revealed by the testing, and report annually to a 
broker-dealer’s senior management about the results.30 The controls must 
cover (i) customer account activity conducted by branch office managers 
and other supervisors; (ii) customer account activity, such as the transmittal 
of funds or securities, address changes, and changes of investment 
objectives; and (iii) heightened supervision of certain “producing 
managers” who generate a significant portion of the revenue of a particular 
business unit.31 This kind of supervisory control system and related testing 
requires compliance specialists who understand supervisory and compliance 
systems and potential weaknesses in them and who follow industry 
developments with respect to their improvement. In addition, FINRA Rule 
3130 (former NASD Rule 3013) requires a firm to appoint at least one chief 
compliance officer (CCO).32 Under this rule, a firm’s chief executive officer 
(CEO) must also certify annually that there are “in place processes to 
establish, maintain, review, test and modify written compliance policies and 
written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance 
with” SRO rules and federal securities laws and regulations, and FINRA 
Rule 3130 requires that the CEO has had “one or more meetings” with the 
CCO in the preceding twelve months to discuss the processes.33 This latter 
rule is both a regulatory acknowledgment of the importance of compliance 
and an effort to increase its importance and visibility in the management of 
broker-dealers. The CCO became the standard bearer of compliance in the 
managerial ranks of the firm. 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See NASD Rules, supra note 24 (NASD Rule 3012(a)(1)). The initial spark for this rule 
was a notable failure of supervision where, undetected, a broker misappropriated over $100 
million in customer money for over fifteen years. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange 
Act Release No. 49,883, 2004 WL 1574002 (June 17, 2004), at *1 (recounting SG Cowen Sec. 
Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 48,335, 2003 WL 21946839 (Aug. 14, 2003)). 
 30. See NASD Rules, supra note 24 (NASD Rule 3012(a)(1)). 
 31. See id. (NASD Rule 3012(a)(2)). 
 32. See FINRA MANUAL, supra note 24, at 5111 (FINRA Rule 3130(a)); NASD, Notice to 
Members No. 04-79, at 974 (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups 
/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p011955.pdf (“NASD Rule 3013 is intended to 
bolster attention to members’ compliance programs by requiring substantial and purposeful 
interaction between business and compliance officers throughout the firm.”). 
 33. See FINRA MANUAL, supra note 24, at 5111 (FINRA Rule 3130(b)). The rule also 
provides a “model” certification for the CEO. See id. at 5111–12 (FINRA Rule 3130(c)). 
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In their separate ways, therefore, the Exchange Act requirements and 
SRO rules helped transform compliance into a specialized function within 
broker-dealers. In the early days of compliance, firm supervisors, aided by 
in-house lawyers and outside counsel, ensured that their firm and 
employees complied with the securities laws and regulations, as well as 
SRO rules and standards.34 This model is still found in small broker-dealers, 
which operate with fewer resources than do large firms and where, for cost 
reasons, firm supervisors and other employees often wear multiple hats, 
including that of the CCO.35 However, compliance has become an 
increasingly specialized occupation in larger firms, as the SEC and the 
SROs pushed them to have a compliance function that reflects their size and 
activities.36 The increase in the number and complexity of financial 
activities of larger firms and the accompanying growth in laws and 
regulations relating to them mean that firm supervisors can no longer stay 
current with all of the legal, regulatory, and SRO responsibilities of their 
firm and associated persons.37 They thus have to create and then rely upon a 
specialized department within the firm, compliance, whose officers can 
devote most of their time and efforts to the compliance tasks. 
As for the tasks of the typical compliance officer, first and foremost, he 
or she provides advice, on a daily basis, to brokers and their supervisors on 
the compliance requirements for business activities.38 A major, and indeed 
monumental, job of compliance officers is also to produce, and to keep 
current, the WSPs.39 To accomplish this task, compliance officers must 
work closely with business employees to understand a particular business 
activity, for the WSPs dictate how firm employees should conduct the firm 
so as to comply with laws and regulations and how the activity should be 
supervised and monitored. In many ways, then, the typical WSP is a step-
by-step guide to the activity (e.g., how a broker should conduct a sale, how 
a firm can do advertising, and how must a trade be processed). Compliance 
officers must also refine existing WSPs in response to problems or gaps in 
them revealed by the firm’s experience, by the testing mandated by NASD 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See generally SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 1. 
 35. See id. at 2–3 (discussing different compliance needs and structure of small firms). Smaller 
firms may also “outsource” some of their compliance tasks. Id. at 2 n.10. 
 36.  See, e.g., Prudential Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 33,082, 1993 WL 430273, at 
*27 (Oct. 21, 1993) (requiring firm to have a compliance function to reflect its business). 
 37. See generally SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE 18 
(2013) [hereinafter SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE], available at 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/PDFs/SIFMA-
evolving-role-of-compliance-2013.pdf (discussing different compliance models). An early writer 
on financial firm compliance observed that it took shape as a specialized activity in the early 
1960s. See Vass, supra note 9, at 54. 
 38. See SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 3; see also Vass, 
supra note 9, at 56 (referring to compliance, not pejoratively, as a “dumping ground” for firm 
issues) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39. See SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 4. 
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Rule 3012, or as a result of issues in them raised by FINRA or the SEC 
because of their inspection of a firm or because of the regulator’s concern 
over industry-wide matters.40 Since new laws and regulations appear 
constantly, the production and refinement of WSPs are never-ending tasks. 
Compliance officers monitor the activities of brokers, often through the 
production and review of reports on transactions, to determine whether the 
procedures are in fact being followed.41 Today, compliance monitoring is 
aided by technology, which has greatly automated the reporting and review 
process.42 Compliance officers identify, and then follow up on, compliance 
problems or “red flags.” Compliance officers are responsible, through their 
surveillance, for finding out when the WSPs are not being followed, which 
may be due to anything from an innocent mistake, to purposeful, but not 
harmful, noncompliance, to outright fraud. Compliance officers also detect 
problems through the routine internal inspections of offices and branches 
that are part of the supervisory system.43 Moreover, they are usually the 
firm personnel who assist SROs, the SEC, and other regulators in regulatory 
examinations of their firms, and as a result they may detect problems, or at 
least regulatory concerns, through their interaction with the examiners.44 
Here, the work of compliance touches on the sensitive subject of 
enforcement of the securities and other laws and potential reporting of 
illegality to FINRA and the SEC. Although compliance officers may 
identify problems from their monitoring and inspections and assist in the 
conduct of investigations, the determination as to what to do about the 
violations generally belongs to firm supervisors.45 
It is worthwhile to raise here an important issue about the relationship 
between supervision and compliance that has not been definitively resolved. 
Supervision refers to the power of one person over another in a firm’s chain 
of command, which includes, as discussed above, the obligation to ensure 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. at 4–5. This is often referred to as compliance’s “control,” as opposed to 
“advisory,” function. See SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 37, at 4. The 
most significant monitoring report is the “exception” report, which lists transactions that are 
outside certain parameters specified by the WSPs or that are otherwise flagged as suspicious, such 
as excessive trading or inappropriate concentration of certain products in customer accounts. See 
Vass, supra note 9, at 12 (discussing exception report). 
 42. For an excellent discussion of problems inherent in the use of technology in compliance, 
see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 
88 TEX. L. REV. 669 (2010). 
 43. See NASD Rules, supra note 24 (NASD Rule 3010(c)); see also SIA, WHITE PAPER ON 
THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 5; SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, 
supra note 37, at 24–25. 
 44. See also SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 6; SIFMA, 
THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 37, at 26. A broker-dealer is subject to 
examination both by the SEC and FINRA, on a regular basis, as well as “for cause” (i.e., as a 
result of a complaint) or because of an overall investigation into brokerage practices. For a general 
discussion of this subject, see POSER & FANTO, supra note 6.  
 45. See SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 37, at 9–10. 
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that the supervised employee complies with securities laws and 
regulations.46 It is often typified by the power of the supervisor to control 
the actions of, and ultimately to dismiss, an employee.47 Compliance in a 
broker-dealer is not, without more, part of the supervisory structure, and a 
compliance officer is not, again without more, a supervisor. Rather, as 
explained above, compliance makes effective supervision possible. 
Compliance officers are not themselves supervisors insofar as they do not 
tell employees what to do or make disciplinary decisions when a violation 
is found—those actions are for the supervisors, and investigations are 
generally for legal officers. However, the SEC has held that, once a 
compliance or legal officer has a sufficient position of influence within a 
firm, he or she may have the responsibility, with other supervisors, for 
taking appropriate action in response to misconduct.48 This action could 
include, in extreme circumstances such as when the main supervisors do not 
adequately respond to the misconduct, escalating the matter to the board of 
directors, resigning, or reporting the problem to regulatory authorities.49 
Since there has been a notable recent instance where a compliance officer 
was alleged to be a supervisor,50 it has been recommended that compliance 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 10. 
 47. See Huff, Exchange Act Release No. 29,017, 1991 WL 296561, at *9 (Mar. 28, 1991). In a 
seminal SEC decision on this subject, Gutfreund, the SEC made the following observation in the 
context of discussing the supervisory responsibilities of legal and compliance officers, which 
offers a broader view than the control standard: 
 
Employees of brokerage firms who have legal or compliance responsibilities do not 
become “supervisors” for purposes of Sections 15(b)(4)(E) and 15(b)(6) solely because 
they occupy those positions. Rather, determining if a particular person is a “supervisor” 
depends on whether, under the facts and circumstances of a particular case, that person has 
a requisite degree of responsibility, ability or authority to affect the conduct of the 
employee whose behavior is at issue. 
 
See Gutfreund, supra note 22, at *15 (emphasis added). 
 48. See Gutfreund, supra note 22, at *14.  
 49. See id. at *16. Arguably, the position taken by the SEC in the Urban case discussed below 
is broader than the two traditional theories of “control” and “affect,” since it finds supervisory 
liability when a person, such as a compliance officer, has “authority” in the firm, i.e., is listened 
to. See Urban, Initial Decision Release No. 402, 2010 WL 3500928, at *38 (Sept. 8, 2010) 
[hereinafter Urban]. 
 50. Urban, supra note 49. Urban, who was a general counsel and also the CCO of a broker-
dealer, attempted to take action against a rogue broker, who engaged in numerous legal violations, 
including unauthorized trading in client accounts and doing trades for a stock manipulator. Id. at 
*1, *13. Urban urged that the broker be dismissed, but he was overruled by the head of retail sales 
who agreed to supervise him personally. Id. at *21. The broker ultimately left the firm in the wake 
of numerous customer problems that resulted in a significant financial outlay by the broker-dealer. 
Id. at *25. Urban was charged with a supervisory violation. Id. at *38. The administrative law 
judge ruled that he was in fact a supervisor, but that he had fulfilled his supervisory 
responsibilities. Id. at *44–48. At the urging of the Enforcement Division, the SEC declined to 
affirm the judge’s ruling, stating, among other things, that it needed to consider whether it was 
enough for Urban to report problems to the supervisor of the broker or whether he should have 
escalated the matter to the firm’s chief executive officer and its board of directors. See Urban, 
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officers ensure that there is clear reporting structure in their firm, which 
shows that they are outside the supervisory structure.51 
Furthermore, compliance officers serve as educators within the broker-
dealer. Brokers have a continuing education obligation,52 and every broker 
must certify annually that he or she is in compliance with applicable laws 
and regulations.53 Compliance officers are generally responsible for 
obtaining this certification (or for monitoring the technology permitting it), 
and they must provide, or arrange for the provision of, the necessary 
continuing education.54 They are also involved in workforce training when 
new products or a new business line are being introduced, which requires 
education for brokers about how to sell the products or do the new business 
in compliance with the law.55 Compliance officers also conduct training in 
professional and ethical standards as well as produce and administer a code 
of ethical conduct for the firm.56 In this role, they may be asked to provide 
advice on ethical issues, as well as on matters that fall within the grey areas 
of the law. 
The position of compliance officer in a broker-dealer is indeed diverse, 
often entailing such varied roles as advisor to employees involved in the 
securities business, transcriber of WSPs, monitor and investigator of 
problems, and ethical counselor. It is no wonder that this position has 
assumed a growing importance in firms, a subject to which I shall now turn. 
                                                                                                                 
Exchange Act Release No. 63,456, 2010 WL 5092728 (Dec. 7, 2010) (order denying motion for 
summary affirmance). Eventually, the SEC dismissed the proceedings because, with three 
members recusing themselves, the other two split on the decision. See Urban, Exchange Act 
Release No. 66,259, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3366, 2012 WL 1024025 (Jan 26, 
2012) (order dismissing proceeding). The case raised concern among practitioners that compliance 
officers were being inappropriately pulled into the supervisory structure of a firm. See, e.g., David 
C. Prince, NSCP Files Amicus Brief with SEC in Theodore W. Urban Case, NSCP CURRENTS, 
Nov.–Dec. 2010, at 1, available at http://www.netacn.com/documents/nov-dec-2010.pdf 
(discussing position of the National Society of Compliance Professionals on this case). 
 51. See SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 37, at 17. 
 52. For a discussion of the continuing education obligations of broker-dealers and their 
registered representatives, see POSER & FANTO, supra note 6, § 6-56.10 to 6-56.12. These 
requirements are set out in FINRA Rule 1250. Generally, a broker has an obligation to fulfill a 
continuing education requirement every three years. See FINRA MANUAL, supra note 24, at 
3115–20. 
 53. See NASD Rules, supra note 24 (NASD Rule 3010(a)(7)). 
 54. See SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 4. 
 55. See id. at 7. 
 56. See id.; SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 37, at 27–28. In 
addition, compliance officers have many specialized functions too numerous to discuss here: for 
example, they oversee the screening process and background checks for employees, as well as 
their licensing and qualifications; they establish and oversee anti-money laundering and Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act programs; they establish control programs for the safeguarding of customer 
nonpublic personal information; and they oversee procedures designed to prevent insider trading 
and other conflicts of interest. See generally id. at 24–26. 
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II. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF COMPLIANCE 
Compliance officers are thus in every broker-dealer, which now number 
approximately 4200 firms.57 Since under FINRA rules every firm must have 
a CCO,58 the number of brokerage employees engaged primarily in 
compliance is, at a minimum, equal to the number of firms. Larger firms are 
likely to have more compliance officers because their businesses are diverse 
and complex and thus demand a more developed compliance function.59 
Many of those who have the position of compliance officer or CCO in 
smaller firms have other jobs and do not devote themselves fulltime to 
compliance.60 Compliance officers work in all kinds of organizational 
structures, depending upon the size and businesses of a firm.61 In large 
broker-dealers, they would generally be in a separate department or division 
under the CCO and thus in a separate reporting line from brokers. Although 
there is not extensive information available about compliance 
compensation,62 the data shows that it is less than compensation for bankers 
and brokers because it is not based directly on business results.63 However, 
the gap between compliance and business personnel has diminished as 
compensation for compliance officers has increased in recent years.64 
                                                                                                                 
 57. According to FINRA statistics, which are the most recent as of October 2013, there are 
4195 member firms, with 162,808 branch offices and 634,955 registered representatives. See 
FINRA Statistics, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Statistics/ (last updated July 12, 2013). 
The firms fall into four rough categories: (i) approximately 200 large firms, which historically 
were members of the New York Stock Exchange, which have most of the customer assets and 
most of the industry’s revenue and which are often in large financial groups; (ii) mid-sized, full-
line firms, which are generally regional; (iii) discount brokerage firms; and (iv) smaller firms, 
sometimes operating with only few brokers. See SIFMA, FACT BOOK 2009, at 43 (2009) 
(discussing the kinds of broker-dealers). 
 58. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 59. For a description of compliance at Goldman Sachs, see Our Divisions: Global 
Compliance, GOLDMAN SACHS, http://www.goldmansachs.com/careers/why-goldman-sachs/our-
divisions/global-compliance/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).  
 60. Cf. NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., NRS COMPLIANCE COMPENSATION STUDY 2011, at 5 
(2011) [hereinafter NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS.], available at http://www.nrs-inc.com/Global 
/White%20Papers/NRS%20Compliance%20Compensation%20Study%202011_web.pdf 
(reporting that even CCOs in major firms spend only half of their time on compliance). 
 61. See generally SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 37, at 17–18 
(discussing the various compliance structures used). 
 62. See generally NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., supra note 60, at 5 (providing general survey 
data on compliance compensation); SOC’Y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS, 2012 CROSS 
INDUSTRY CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICERS SALARY SURVEY 19 (2012) (indicating average 
compensation for CCOs in financial services to be approximately $165,000); see also 
Occupational Employment Statistics, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/oes/current 
/oes131041.htm (reporting the mean annual wage of compliance officers in other financial 
services as $64,960). 
 63.  INST. OF INT’L FIN. IN COLLABORATION WITH OLIVER WYMAN, COMPENSATION REFORM 
IN WHOLESALE BANKING 2010: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL STANDARDS 22–23 
(2010), available at http://www.iif.com/download.php?id=lcQmuRRwWEM= . 
 64. Id. (discussing the narrowing gap between compensation of business employees and those 
in control functions). Compliance officer compensation has recently stabilized. See NAT’L 
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Compliance gained in importance as a result of the financial crisis. The 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(Dodd-Frank), with its accompanying SEC regulations, has resulted in more 
work for compliance because compliance officers have to translate the new 
laws and regulations into WSPs with accompanying monitoring, reporting, 
and inspections.65 In addition, after the crisis, regulators and SROs have 
increased their oversight of financial firms and their enforcement of the 
laws, rules, and standards, which increases the work of compliance officers. 
Both the SEC and FINRA revamped their examinations of broker-dealers 
with, among other things, the involvement of more specialist examiners, the 
sharing of information among divisions (including the enforcement 
division), and more examinations targeting firms with the highest risks.66 
The SEC beefed up its enforcement function by forming prosecutorial 
groups focusing on particular kinds of financial institutions and specific 
abuses.67 This examination and enforcement activity demands the attention 
of the compliance officer, who generally is the point person for the firm in 
regulatory examinations and who assists the firm’s legal officers in 
responding to enforcement inquiries. 
Congress in Dodd-Frank and the SEC in its regulations also use the 
existing model of broker-dealer compliance for previously unregulated 
financial participants. For instance, a significant part of the legislation 
involved the regulation of the swap markets and their major participants.68 
                                                                                                                 
REGULATORY SERVS., supra note 60, at 2 (noting that compensation for compliance professionals 
has stagnated since 2008, despite new regulatory demands). 
 65. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 66. The requirement to enhance examinations was primarily motivated by the SEC’s failure to 
detect the Bernard Madoff scandal, which was revealed when his Ponzi scheme collapsed during 
the crisis. See POSER & FANTO, supra note 6, § 7-60 to 7-64. The SEC’s enhancement of 
examinations was mandated by Congress in Dodd-Frank section 929U, which, among other 
things, added a new section 4E of the Exchange Act. See Dodd-Frank Act sec. 4E, § 929U, 124 
Stat. at 1867–68 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5 (2012)). This provision required 
specialized examiners for the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets, which oversees broker-
dealers. Id. On the SEC’s risk-based examination system, see SEC, FISCAL YEAR 2012 AGENCY 
FINANCIAL REPORT 3 (2012) [hereinafter SEC FISCAL YEAR 2012 REPORT], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2012.pdf. On FINRA’s enhancement to its own 
examinations in reaction to the scandal, see FINRA SPECIAL REVIEW COMM., REPORT OF THE 
2009 SPECIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE ON FINRA’S EXAMINATION PROGRAM IN LIGHT OF THE 
STANFORD AND MADOFF SCHEMES 6–8 (2009), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups 
/corporate/@corp/documents/corporate/p120078.pdf. 
 67. See, e.g., Robert S. Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks at News 
Conference Announcing Enforcement Cooperation Initiative and New Senior Leaders (Jan. 13, 
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch011310rsk.htm (introducing the 
directors of the five new National Specialized Units (Asset Management, Market Abuse, 
Structured and New Products, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and Municipal Securities and Public 
Pension)). 
 68. See Dodd-Frank Act tit. 7, §§ 721–74, 124 Stat. 1658–1802. Swap regulation was divided 
between the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the SEC, depending upon the nature of 
the underlying asset that was the subject of the swap.  
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Swap dealers are now regulated in a manner that, understandably enough, 
parallels, and is modeled on, that of broker-dealers.69 As a result, a swap 
dealer must have a supervisory structure and record-keeping, which 
naturally demand a compliance function.70 Dodd-Frank has thus ushered in 
a whole new era for compliance, albeit particularly in financial firms like 
investment advisers and swap dealers. 
That compliance officers now have a significant place in broker-dealers 
means that ultimately the regulatory burden emanating from the crisis will 
fall on them. As a result of the financial crisis, as discussed above, 
legislators, regulators, and FINRA officials have shown a renewed zeal for 
law creation and enforcement,71 but their efforts will eventually wane. 
Legislators become distracted with other, more pressing concerns. The SEC 
has limited resources in this time of scarcity, and its budget is neither 
growing nor likely to grow significantly in the future.72 FINRA has 
improved its oversight over broker-dealers.73 Yet while the SRO is closer to 
these firms, its examiners and enforcement staff are not in them on a day-to-
day basis. 
Compliance officers, by contrast, are in the firms, and, as discussed 
above, they are specifically charged with legal, professional, and ethical 
compliance.74 Most importantly, they actually see what is occurring in the 
firms. They are thus well situated to alert supervisors and senior executives 
to growing problems, such as the securitization of subprime loans, which 
may infiltrate the financial industry and gradually grow into a dreaded and 
resented financial crisis. Being involved with compliance and assisting in 
the supervision of every broker and securities activity in a broker-dealer, a 
compliance officer is well positioned to identify such problems perhaps 
before they are transformed into larger, potentially systemic issues. 
Furthermore, given the sheer number of new laws and regulations imposed 
upon broker-dealers as a result of the most recent financial crisis, the 
brokerage industry could not survive without compliance officers. The 
compliance officer today in a broker-dealer does not generally have to 
worry about remaining employed, but he or she is likely to be overwhelmed 
with work.75 A question posed by the symposium is whether the legal 
academy can help him or her with the burden. 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See POSER & FANTO, supra note 6, § 5-40 to 5-44.1. 
 70. Indeed, new section 15F(k) of the Exchange Act dealing with security-based swap dealer 
regulation mandates that such a dealer have a CCO to implement compliance in the dealer. See 15 
U.S.C. § 78o-10(k). 
 71. See supra notes 66–67. 
 72. For a description of the SEC’s lack of adequate financial resources for its mission in recent 
years, see SEC, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2010–2015, at 6–7 (2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/secstratplan1015f.pdf. 
 73. See SEC FISCAL YEAR 2012 REPORT, supra note 66, at 48. 
 74. See supra text accompanying notes 38–56. 
 75. See SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 37, at 18–19. 
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III. COMPLIANCE AND THE LEGAL ACADEMY 
There has been little work on financial compliance in the legal 
academy. It is not that scholars have ignored compliance entirely. Indeed, 
there have been scholarly articles written on compliance in public 
corporations, including studies with the approach of New Governance—an 
academic movement encouraging regulators and the regulated to produce 
more effective regulation by cooperating in rule-making.76 Many New 
Governance insights can be brought to the financial area and could be 
applied to the role of compliance in the development of cooperative 
regulation. In addition, there has been considerable academic work about 
how the emphasis on enforcement and prosecution adversely affects 
regulation, including the regulation of financial institutions.77 This is 
relevant to financial firm compliance insofar as compliance officers can be 
enlisted in the SEC’s and FINRA’s enforcement efforts, as well as 
prosecution by the U.S. Department of Justice.78 Despite these fruitful areas 
of scholarly activity with their occasional references to financial 
compliance, there has been little sustained attention to this subject. 
Given the nature of the legal academy and its relationship to legal 
practice, this lack of attention is not surprising. Compliance is part of the 
day-to-day operations of broker-dealers and is a technical feature of broker-
dealer practice. Law professors who specialize in securities law spend most 
of their time on issues related to capital raising and public company 
disclosure and considerably less time on market structure and particularly 
on market intermediaries.79 Their orientation may reflect the traditional 
desired destination of the students of elite schools, the large corporate law 
firms that focus primarily upon financing and transactions,80 not on the 
                                                                                                                 
 76. See generally Orly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 65 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012). 
 77. See generally Miriam Baer, Organizational Liability and the Tension Between Corporate 
and Criminal Law, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2010) (arguing that the emphasis on prosecutorial 
discretion as a means of rehabilitating corporate wrongdoers creates the potential for waste and 
abuse and detracts from the need for corporate and securities laws that decrease the underlying 
risks of criminal misconduct); John Hasnas, Managing the Risks of Legal Compliance: Conflicting 
Demands of Law and Ethics, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 507, 517 (2008) (“[T]he use of extrinsic 
punishment and rewards by the command-and-control approach undermines the intrinsic 
motivation necessary to the self-regulatory approach.”). 
 78. See SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 37, at 35 (discussing 
regulators’ “deputizing” compliance officers as their agents). 
 79. This is exemplified by the coverage in securities law textbooks. For example, one 
prominent book spends about 450 pages on capital raising and about 140 pages on securities 
markets and broker-dealers. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES 
REGULATION (12th ed. 2012). 
 80. On the destination of elite school graduates, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN 
AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 167 (2002). See also Ralph Nader, Corporate Law Firms and the 
Perversion of Justice: What Public Interest Lawyers Can Do About It, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
53 (1999). 
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operations of intermediaries like broker-dealers or securities exchanges.81 
Moreover, even scholars who occasionally study intermediaries are likely to 
be interested in legal issues like fiduciary duties that are more academic and 
jurisprudential, rather than in the day-to-day operations of compliance 
departments.82 The relative lack of attention in the legal academy to 
compliance may also reflect that compliance as a field was not traditionally 
the exclusive domain of lawyers, but included operations and back office 
personnel.83 Finally, my personal impression is that few legal academics 
today come to law teaching from as specialized a practice background as 
financial firm compliance. They are thus not likely to have the experience 
to write about it. 
Things may now be changing. There is an employment reason for this 
transformation because there is a perception, whether it is right or wrong, 
that financial firm compliance offers job opportunities for students in this 
difficult employment environment. This may be true since, given the sheer 
number of regulations that compliance must handle, it is useful for 
compliance officers to have legal training. Indeed, law schools are now 
entering into the process of training students for compliance positions84 and 
providing externships with financial regulators or within compliance 
departments of financial firms.85 Moreover, since law schools are feeling 
the pressure to prepare their students for the practicing world that awaits 
them, they might provide a transition course in compliance for students 
entering the field.86 Thus, this perceived need to teach about compliance 
may spur more scholarly focus on the subject, and it was precisely to 
stimulate this scholarly work that the symposium was organized. 
This new academic focus on compliance may be beneficial. As has 
been explained above, compliance officers occupy a difficult, but important, 
position in financial firms, translating the laws and regulations into actual 
firm practice and serving as an intermediary between the regulators and the 
regulated.87 It would be valuable if academics could reflect upon this role 
                                                                                                                 
 81.  See Sida Liu, The Legal Profession as a Social Process: A Theory on Lawyers and 
Globalization, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 670, 681 (2013) (discussing what elite corporate firms do). 
 82. See, e.g., Arthur Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should Be 
Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707 (2012). Professor Laby, a former SEC staff member, is one of 
the few professors who understands compliance, but even his work centers more on properly legal 
topics like fiduciary duty. 
 83. But see Vass, supra note 9, at 55 (“In the earlier years, persons who served as internal 
general counsels were often also designated as Compliance officers.”). 
 84. The Regulatory Compliance Association offers online education in asset management 
compliance in conjunction with law schools. See Law & Masters Degree, REG. COMPLIANCE 
ASS’N, https://www.rcaonline.org/law-masters-degree/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).  
 85. Our own law school has for a long time offered externships with FINRA, the SEC, and 
financial firms. 
 86. The author offers such a course at Brooklyn Law School together with compliance officers 
and other specialists in the compliance field. It is entitled “An Introduction to Compliance and 
Risk Management in Financial Institutions.”  
 87. See supra Part II.  
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with all the imagination (and without the concern about not offending their 
clients) that they typically bring to the task. This attention could of course 
have unpredictable results because it is certainly possible that they would 
criticize compliance and even argue that it be reduced in firms. To give an 
example, Professor Birdthistle, who was a participant in our symposium, 
has co-written an article with Professor Todd Henderson of the University 
of Chicago.88 In this paper, among other things, they criticize the 
compliance industry as part of their overall criticism of FINRA’s 
transformation from an SRO into a quasi-governmental regulator.89 Their 
implication is that compliance officers and compliance consultants, often 
drawn from regulators and FINRA, do not want to challenge the current 
regulatory status quo of FINRA’s dominance since they profit from it, even 
if this situation is not the best for the financial industry and investors.90 
Alternatively, law professors could look critically at the current 
functioning of compliance, identify issues or problems in it, and suggest 
how compliance officers could address these issues and improve their 
performance. Legal academics are particularly useful in this regard, again 
because they are not beholden to specific clients and because they take a 
broad view of the subject matter, which might enable them to see trends and 
issues not clear to those “in the trenches.” This kind of scholarly work was 
evident at the symposium. Professor Barbara Black, a noted securities 
scholar who has longstanding experience with FINRA’s disciplinary 
proceedings through her participation on its National Adjudicatory Council, 
reflected upon the compliance-specific implications of FINRA sanctions, 
which are expressly remedial rather than punitive.91 Professor Jerry 
Markham raised an issue that has been the subject of considerable concern 
in the compliance industry throughout financial services: the safe custody 
of customer assets.92 
As he identified, the issue has surfaced in failures or scandals in 
different kinds of financial firms, such as broker-dealers, investment 
advisers, and commodities firms, where the firms inappropriately used or 
                                                                                                                 
 88. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1 (2013). Professor Birdthistle, who was sick on the day of the symposium, spoke by 
videoconference. 
 89. See id. at 44–49. 
 90. See id. at 48. 
 91. See Barbara Black, Punishing Bad Brokers: Self-Regulation and FINRA Sanctions, 8 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 23, 46 (2013). 
 92. This is because, perhaps starting with the Bernard Madoff case, there have been repeated 
cases of financial firms either stealing customer assets or using them improperly. The most recent 
case was MF Global, where customer assets were used essentially to prop up the firm, which was 
failing because of its bets on European government securities. See Report of Investigation of 
Louis J. Freeh, Chapter 11 Trustee of MF Global Holdings, Ltd. et al., In re MF Global Holdings 
Ltd., No. 11-15059 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.mfglobalcaseinfo.com/pdflib/1279_15059.pdf (discussing the scandal). 
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simply misappropriated customer assets.93 Professor Markham provided an 
overview of this problem and the regulatory responses to it, which could 
help in the reform process as regulators decide upon the most effective 
approach to safeguarding customer assets. Professor Deborah DeMott 
examined the position of the CCO and its importance in enhancing the 
firm’s reputation.94  
Legal scholars could also aid compliance because they often bring 
insights from other academic disciplines into their legal analysis. One of the 
most prominent academics who has often drawn insights from psychology 
and organizational studies is Professor Donald Langevoort, who at our 
symposium offered comments on other professors’ papers.95 He intriguingly 
raised the point that compliance’s task of helping to ensure that financial 
firm employees comply with the law is all the more challenging because of 
the very nature of the business employees. He meant here physical nature, 
citing intriguing work on the neurological basis of financial risk-taking. In a 
similarly broad vein, Professor Tamar Frankel (albeit through a proxy, since 
she could not attend the symposium because of the weather) explored the 
beneficial effect of codes of conduct in changing the culture of regulated 
investment funds with respect to deterring insider trading.96 From her 
typically broad perspective, which incorporates learning from ethical 
studies, she offered thoughts on why the codes work in this situation, which 
could serve as a model for other financial firms wishing to have effective 
codes.97 
I offered my own psychologically based reflections on compliance at 
the symposium. To take one case discussed above, compliance officers 
spend a lot of time drafting and revising WSPs and then monitoring the 
brokers’ compliance with them.98 Despite these detailed directions and 
monitoring, it is not possible for compliance officers to cover every topic 
and to oversee all activity in brokerage operations. Indeed, this kind of 
extensive direction and oversight might even have a negative effect in a 
field like brokerage, many of whose activities are not routine, and which 
benefits from the discretion and independence given to its employees.99 If 
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the WSPs produce too much routine behavior and the monitoring is too 
heavy-handed, brokers and bankers may see the compliance procedures as 
external to their business and ultimately as a hindrance, to be complied with 
only formally or even “gamed.”100 Compliance officers will likely succeed 
in catching most of the egregious violations through this kind of 
monitoring, but there are likely to be others that slip by them.101 More 
significantly, there may be problems that do not rise yet to the level of 
violations but that could do so in time or that pose professional or ethical 
issues, which may have an eventual, calamitous effect upon the firm if 
brokers continue to engage in them. 
While compliance officers must continue to produce the WSPs (if only 
to let brokers know about their legal obligations) and to monitor for 
compliance, their ultimate goal has to be self- or internal compliance by a 
broker—the compliance officer would be left essentially to be an advisor on 
difficult issues.102 In other words, the ideal purpose of a compliance officer 
would be to have brokers internalize legal and regulatory policies and 
ethical standards so that these policies and standards come to the 
foreground in their decision-making and displace others, such as self-
interest, which could lead to legal and ethical violations.103 This purpose 
falls squarely within the educational and cultural role of compliance. Yet in 
order to promote this internal compliance, compliance officers would have 
to understand how decision-making in fact occurs in people, particularly 
when they have competing goals and work in cohesive groups and 
organizations, and what techniques might be used to encourage brokers to 
focus on legal and ethical standards in decision-making. This understanding 
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is likely to come from the disciplines of psychology, social psychology, 
organizational studies, and, to a lesser extent, from economics.104 
For a long time, management scholars have provided these kinds of 
insights and guidance to managers and executives, who of course are 
concerned with having legally and ethically compliant organizations and 
employees.105 It seems to me that legal scholars who follow developments, 
or who are even trained, in the above fields could do the same for 
compliance officers, particularly, as noted above, since an increasing 
number of compliance officers have legal training and are open to 
discussions with law professors. This work should be attractive to securities 
law scholars, for they are concerned with legal policies that improve the 
functioning of markets and market intermediaries. Certainly, investors will 
actively participate in securities markets if they perceive, partly as a result 
of a more robust compliance, that the broker is acting on their behalf in 
accordance with securities law policies and SRO professional standards, 
and not just thinking of investors as a personal profit center. 
CONCLUSION 
The symposium at Brooklyn Law School, as well as the contributions in 
this issue, recognizes the growth and importance of compliance in financial 
firms. Its growth was initially spurred by the statutory and regulatory 
requirements of broker-dealers to have supervisory systems to address the 
potential supervisory liability of the firm and its managers for legal and 
ethical violations by its employees. As the legal, regulatory, and ethical 
obligations on firms and their employees have grown over the past forty 
years, compliance has evolved from a minor task performed by a supervisor 
with the assistance of outside counsel, or by back office personnel, to a 
developed control function in the firm. Now compliance officers, who are 
required in every firm, often preside over a large department and have a seat 
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at the table of top management. With the growth of compliance has come 
its development as a career path, which is attractive in a tight job market. 
For this and for other reasons, compliance is now noticed by law schools. 
I have argued in this introductory Article that the new attention to 
compliance could be fruitful both to legal scholars and to compliance 
officers. The latter occupy a key place on the front lines of financial firms 
between regulators and employees conducting the securities business. They 
are expected to help firm employees comply with legal and ethical 
obligations in jobs that demand considerable freedom and discretion. If 
compliance officers are to be successful in this goal, they need to do more 
than simply translate the laws and rules for employees and monitor 
compliance with them. They have to promote compliant conduct within the 
employees themselves, which is a complex advisory and educational task. 
The interaction between compliance officers and legal scholars, who follow 
developments in disciplines like social psychology and organizational 
research that study how to promote compliant and ethical conduct, could 
contribute to the future growth and success of compliance itself. Let us 
hope that our symposium will be one of many steps in this fruitful 
collaboration. 
